![]() He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favor, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the mother-country. In earlier times the merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. It was not always so, nor does peace always endure, though the United States have been favored by so long a continuance of it. In the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. This is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.Īs a nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. It is possible that when a canal route through the Central-American Isthmus is seen to be a near certainty, the aggressive impulse may he strong enough to lead to the same result. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences. The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by theĬontrol of the sea. ![]() The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. ![]() The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. Ihre Beherrschung würde über das weitere Schicksal und internationale Gewicht der Nationen bestimmen.ĭaher benötigten die USA eine schlagkräftige Flotte. ![]() Jahrhundert inspiriert, forderte Mahan in seinem einflussreichen Werk dazu auf, die Ozeane nicht mehr als Hindernisse, sondern als große Verkehrsstraßen zu betrachten, die es zu nutzen galt. Von der römischen Geschichte und seinen Untersuchungen zum 17. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 1890Īlfred T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 1890 Start > In Weltpolitik und Erstem Weltkrieg > Alfred T. ![]()
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